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Research Article
Unifying Representations and 
Responses
Perseverative Biases Arise From a Single Behavioral System
John P. Spencer† and Anne R. Schutte
University of  Iowa
ABSTRACT—A dominant account of  perseverative errors in early 
development contends that such errors refl ect a failure to inhibit 
a prepotent response. This study investigated whether persevera-
tion might also arise from a failure to inhibit a prepotent repre-
sentation. Children watched as a toy was hidden at an A location, 
waited during a delay, and then watched the experimenter fi nd the 
toy. After six observation-only A trials, the toy was hidden at a B 
location, and children were allowed to search for the toy. Two- and 
4-year-olds’ responses on the B trials were signifi cantly biased to-
ward A even though they had never overtly responded to this loca-
tion. Thus, perseverative biases in early development can arise as a 
result of  prepotent representations, demonstrating that the prepo-
tent-response account is incomplete. We discuss three alternative 
interpretations of  these results, including the possibility that rep-
resentational and response-based biases refl ect the operation of  a 
single, integrated behavioral system.
◊          ◊          ◊
The demonstration of  a behavioral dissociation is often used 
to infer the presence of  multiple, separable systems (e.g., Goo-
dale & Milner, 1992; Milner, 1963; Robertson & Marshall, 1993). 
Recently, however, connectionist and dynamic systems models 
have demonstrated that such dissociations can arise from sin-
gle systems that operate in different ways in different situations 
(e.g., Munakata, 2001; Thelen, Schöner, Scheier, & Smith, 2001; 
Van Orden, Pennington, & Stone, 2001). This debate is particu-
larly germane to the fi eld of  early development, in which sev-
eral developmental dissociations between knowing and acting 
have been reported (e.g., Zelazo, Frye, & Rapus, 1996; Zelazo & 
Reznick, 1991). For instance, when tested in violation-of-expec-
tancy paradigms, 3.5-month-old infants appear to know that 
objects continue to exist when out of  sight (Baillargeon, 1987). 
In the Piagetian A-not-B task, however, 8- to 10-month-old in-
fants perseveratively reach to one location after seeing a toy 
clearly hidden at a second location (e.g., Piaget, 1954; Smith, 
Thelen, Titzer, & McLin, 1999). Related perseverative errors 
persist into early childhood (e.g., DeLoache & Brown, 1983; 
Schutte & Spencer, 2002; Spencer, Smith, & Thelen, 2001). Does 
this dissociation between knowing and acting refl ect the opera-
tion of  two systems or one? Answering this question provides a 
unique window onto the organization, use, and development of  
behavioral systems.
One dominant account of  this striking developmental pat-
tern relies on a two-systems view: Children have an accurate 
representation of  the hiding locations in the A-not-B task; 
however, they err because of  a failure to inhibit a prepotent re-
sponse to A (e.g., Zelazo, Reznick, & Spinazzola, 1998; for relat-
ed ideas, see Diamond, 1990, 1991). Thus, A-not-B-type errors 
arise because a response system dominates an accurate but weak 
representational system. In time, children come to rely more on 
representations and can more effectively regulate the response 
system; consequently, A-not-B-type errors decline (Marcovitch 
& Zelazo, 1999; Zelazo et al., 1998).
Strong support for the prepotent-response view comes from 
a recent study by Zelazo and his colleagues (1998). In this A-
not-B-type experiment, 2-year-olds watched as the experi-
menter hid an object at an A location. Next, they watched the 
experimenter engage in a multistep sequence to retrieve the 
object; the last step in this sequence required the selection of  
an object in a location spatially aligned with A. This set of  
events was repeated several times. Then, an object was hid-
den at a B location, and the children were allowed to retrieve 
the object by repeating the multistep sequence. If  persevera-
tive errors are caused by a failure to inhibit a prepotent re-
sponse, then during these B trials, children should have select-
ed the object in the location aligned with B in the last step of  
the multistep sequence because they never overtly responded 
to the location aligned with A. This was indeed the case. In 
contrast, a control group that retrieved the object on all tri-
als selected the location aligned with A. The authors conclud-
ed that overt responding is a necessary component of  perse-
verative search behaviors (but see Jacques, Zelazo, Kirkham, 
& Semcesen, 1999, for an alternative interpretation of  perfor-
mance in a nonsearch task).
† Corresponding author; Email: john-spencer@uiowa.edu
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The underlying logic of  this observation-only methodol-
ogy assumes that children construct the same representations 
in both observation only and respond conditions. This may not 
be the case. Children might, for instance, construct a relative-
ly weak representation of  A in observation-only conditions as 
they passively watch the experimenter hide and fi nd an object. 
Recent connectionist models suggest that if  this is the case, 
children might fail to perseverate not because representation-
al states are immune from perseverative biases in early devel-
opment, but because the weak representation of  A does not ef-
fectively compete with the more recent, stronger representation 
of  the B location on B trials (Munakata, 1998, 2001). This sug-
gests that, under some conditions, perseverative biases might 
occur in observation-only conditions. Such a result would call 
into question the prepotent-response account and, more gener-
ally, whether two systems—versus a single system—are needed 
to account for perseverative biases.
In the present study, we sought to provide the fi rst direct ev-
idence that A-not-B-type biases in early development can arise 
from a failure to inhibit a prepotent representation, rather than 
from a failure to inhibit a prepotent response. Previous research 
has demonstrated that after 2-year-olds search for hidden toys 
at an A location in a sandbox, their responses to a B location 
are biased in the direction of  A (Spencer et al., 2001). We exam-
ined whether such biases occur when 2-year-olds observe events 
at A on A trials, but respond on B trials. Our task differed in 
two key ways from the task used by Zelazo et al. (1998). First, 
we eliminated the multistep sequence. Instead, when children 
were allowed to search, they searched directly for the hidden 
object. With this procedure, children should create a strong 
representation of  the target location, because the memory for 
the target does not have to compete with the memory for the 
sequence. However, the sandbox task is still challenging enough 
to observe signifi cant A-not-B-type biases: Young children fi nd 
it diffi cult to fi nd hidden—but unmarked—objects in the sand. 
Second, we encouraged the children to construct a strong repre-
sentation of  A by preventing them from knowing whether they 
would have to respond until after the memory delay. We as-
sumed that given this ambiguity, children would form a strong 
representation of  the target location on all trials just in case 
they were asked to respond.
Our predictions were as follows. If  perseverative errors in 
early development are caused by a failure to inhibit a prepotent 
response, 2-year-olds—as in the study by Zelazo et al. (1998)—
should search correctly on B trials in our observation-only con-
dition. If, however, perseverative errors can arise from strong 
but competing representations—as connectionist models sug-
gest—children should show biases toward A on B trials even 
when they only observed events at A.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
Eighty 2-year-olds (M = 2 years 5.1 months, SD = 1.2 
months)  participated. Data from 10 participants were not an-
alyzed because either the children failed to complete the task 
(n = 7) or there was an experimenter error (n = 3). In addition, 
data from 13 children assigned to the observation-only con-
dition were excluded because they reached on one or more of  
the A trials. Participants were recruited from a database at the 
University of  Iowa and were given a small gift for participat-
ing. The parents of  all participants gave informed consent.
Materials
A circular sandbox (17-in. diameter, 5 in. deep) was used on 
training trials; a long, rectangular sandbox (60 in. long, 16 in. 
wide, 20 in. high) was used for the A-not-B task (see Fig. 1). A 
video camera was mounted on the ceiling above the rectangular 
sandbox to record children’s responses. Before each session, the 
video image was aligned with a grid on a video monitor. Cur-
tains hung from the ceiling eliminated all external landmarks. 
The training task took place outside the curtained area, and the 
A-not-B task took place within the curtained area (see Fig. 1). 
During the A-not-B task, the child stood on an outline of  feet 
taped to the fl oor 12 in. from the child’s side of  the rectangular 
sandbox and aligned with the center of  this sandbox. The child 
stood on the feet from the start of  each trial through the mem-
ory delay, but was allowed to move when searching for the toy. 
The experimenter sat opposite the child, and the parent sat in a 
chair behind the child.
Procedure
Each session began with six training trials conducted in the 
circular sandbox. On the fi rst trial, the experimenter half-buried 
a toy (1 in. tall, 1 in. wide, 1 in. thick) in the center of  the circu-
lar sandbox, counted to 5, and encouraged the child to reach for 
the toy. The second trial was the same except the experimenter 
buried the toy such that only the very top was showing. Next, 
the experimenter introduced a card game and explained that 
he or she would turn over a fl ash card after counting to 5. If  
the card was green, the child was allowed to reach for the toy, 
dig it up, and hold it until the next trial began. If, however, the 
card was red, the experimenter would say, ‘‘It’s my turn,’’ reach 
for the toy, dig it up, and give it to the child. The fl ash cards 
were used on the fi nal four training trials. On these trials, the
Fig. 1. Schematic of  the training and testing areas viewed from 
above. During testing, the experimenter (Exp) sat on one side of  
the rectangular sandbox, with the child and parent on the other. In 
Experiment 1, hiding locations were at 15 and 24 in. from the left 
edge of  the sandbox.
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experimenter buried the toy completely, counted to 5, and 
turned over a fl ash card. The fl ash card on Trial 3 was green, 
and the card on Trial 4 was red. The colors on Trials 5 and 6 
were randomized such that one card was green and one card 
was red. 
After training, the child, parent, and experimenter moved 
into the curtained area. The child completed nine test trials that 
were identical to the last four training trials except for the hid-
ing locations and memory delay. During the fi rst six test trials, 
the experimenter buried the toy at an A location, counted to 3, 
and then turned over a fl ash card. In the observe conditions, the 
fl ash cards on the A trials were always red. Consequently, the 
experimenter searched for the toy. In the reach conditions, the 
fl ash cards on the A trials were always green. Thus, the child 
was allowed to search for the toy. The fi nal three test trials—
the B trials—were identical in all conditions. On these trials, a 
toy was hidden at a B location, the experimenter counted to 10, 
and then the experimenter turned over a green card. Thus, all 
children were allowed to search on these trials.1
Experimental Design
The children were randomly assigned to one of  four condi-
tions. In each condition, toys were hidden at locations in the left 
half  of  the sandbox: 15 in. or 24 in. from the left edge (from the 
child’s perspective; see Fig. 1). For 14 children in the observe con-
dition and 15 children in the reach condition, A was at 15 in. and 
B was at 24 in. For the remaining 14 children in each condition,
1The short delay on the A trials encouraged children to encode 
and remember these locations robustly, whereas the longer delay on 
the B trials taxed memory. Note, however, that A-not-B-type er-
rors occur even with a 10-s delay on both A and B trials (Schutte, 
Spencer, & Schöner, 2003).
A was at 24 in. and B was at 15 in. The counterbalancing of  lo-
cation was necessary because, in addition to showing biases to-
ward A in this task, 2-year-olds show a bias toward the mid-
line of  the sandbox (i.e., toward 30 in.; e.g., Huttenlocher, New-
combe, & Sandberg, 1994). Consequently, when A is in the di-
rection of  the midline relative to B, a bias toward A could re-
fl ect an A-not-B-type bias or a midline bias. By counterbalanc-
ing the A and B locations, we were able to verify whether chil-
dren’s responses were biased toward A regardless of  the layout 
of  A and B. Note, however, that we expected biases toward A to 
be larger when A was in the direction of  the midline relative to 
B, because the A-not-B-type and midline biases ‘‘pulled’’ mem-
ory in the same direction in this case.
Behavioral Scoring
All sessions were scored from videotapes. Scorers coded 
where each child fi rst contacted the sand on the reach trials. If  
the child reached with both hands, the hand that touched the 
sand fi rst was scored. If  both hands touched the sand at the 
same time, the hand closest to the hiding location was scored. 
Responses were coded to the nearest 1/2 inch. A second scorer 
scored 15% of  the sessions. The mean deviation (absolute val-
ue) between the two scorers was 0.70 in. (SD = 0.98 in.). The 
initial scorer’s values were used in all analyses. 
Results and Discussion
To examine whether children showed a bias toward A on 
the B trials in the observe and reach conditions, we coded chil-
dren’s response errors such that positive errors were in the di-
rection of  A relative to B, whereas negative errors were away 
from A. Thus, when B was at 15 in., rightward errors were 
scored as positive because A was at 24 in. By contrast, when 
B was at 24 in., leftward errors were scored as positive. As can 
be seen in Figure 2, children’s responses on the B trials were 
Fig. 2. Two-year-olds’ mean error (in inches) on the B trials in both the observe and the reach conditions when B was 
located 15 in. from the left edge of  the sandbox and when B was located 24 in. from the left edge. Positive errors indicate 
errors toward A; negative errors indicate errors away from A. Asterisks indicate that responses differed signifi cantly from 
zero error. Error bars show SD/2.
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biased toward A in all conditions, although biases toward A 
were  stronger when A was in the direction of  the midline of  
the sandbox relative to B (i.e., B at 15 in.), rather than the oth-
er way around (see also Spencer et al., 2001). Data from each 
condition were analyzed separately by comparing mean re-
sponses on the B trials to zero error.  These t tests indicated that 
responses were signifi cantly biased toward A in the observe con-
ditions, t(13) = 2.68, p < .01, when B was at 15 in. and t(13) = 
2.00, p < .025, when B was at 24 in., as well as in the reach con-
ditions, t(13) = 3.68, p < .005, when B was at 15 in. and t(14) = 
2.62, p = .01, when B was at 24 in.2
Next, we examined whether children’s perseverative biases dif-
fered between the observe and reach conditions. A two-way anal-
ysis of  variance (ANOVA) examining mean error on the B trials, 
with response type (observe, reach) and location (B at 15 in., B at 
24 in.) as between-subjects factors, revealed a signifi cant main ef-
fect of  location, F(1, 53) = 7.99, p < .01. This indicated that bias-
es toward A were signifi cantly larger when A was in the direction 
of  midline than when it was not. No other effects reached signifi -
cance. Thus, biases toward A on the B trials did not differ signifi -
cantly between the observe and reach conditions.
Finally, we examined whether errors on the B trials differed 
from errors on the A trials in the reach condition, to verify that 
biases on the B trials differed from midline biases that might 
arise on the A trials. Errors on the A trials were biased toward 
midline both when B was at 15 in. (M = 1.12 in. toward mid-
line) and when B was at 24 in. (M = 2.28 in. toward midline). 
Moreover, t tests indicated that errors on the B trials differed 
signifi cantly from these errors, t(13) = 3.27, p < .01, when B was 
at 15 in. and t(14) = 6.54, p < .001, when B was at 24 in.3
These results demonstrate—for the fi rst time—that overt re-
sponding is not a necessary component of  young children’s per-
severative biases in search tasks. Two-year-olds’ responses on 
the B trials were signifi cantly biased toward A even when the 
children had never searched for toys at the A location, suggest-
ing that A-not-B-type biases can emerge from a failure to in-
hibit a prepotent representation. It is possible that 2-year-olds 
failed to show perseverative biases in the study by Zelazo et al. 
(1998) because they constructed a weak memory of  A in obser-
vation-only conditions. In the present experiment, when chil-
dren were encouraged to construct a strong memory of  A, they 
showed equally strong perseverative tendencies in the observe 
and reach conditions.
EXPERIMENT 2
Results from Experiment 1 demonstrate that perseverative 
biases can arise because of  competition between the represen-
tation of  a previously remembered location and the represen-
tation of  a current hiding location. These data challenge the 
proposal that perseveration in early development is due to re-
sponse-based processes. Nevertheless, they do not speak to a 
second claim of  the two-systems account: Over development, 
children come to rely more on an accurate representational sys-
tem and less on a response system.
2 It is important to note that biases toward A were signifi cant 
in all conditions, because previous studies of  prepotent representa-
tions failed to fi nd perseverative biases in respond conditions (for a 
discussion of  this issue, see Zelazo et al., 1998).
3 Although the magnitudes of  error on the A and B trials when 
B was at 24 in. were similar, errors on the A trials were biased to-
ward midline, whereas errors on the B trials were biased away from 
midline and toward A.
Data from a recent study allowed us to examine this propos-
al directly. In that study (Schutte, Spencer, & Schöner, 2003), 4-
year-olds made robust A-not-B-type errors in the sandbox task 
when A and B were separated by 6 in. Thus, in Experiment 2, 
we tested 4-year-olds in observe and reach conditions. If  an ac-
curate representational system is becoming more dominant over 
a response system as development takes place—as proponents 
of  the two-systems view have suggested—observation-only er-
rors like the ones reported in Experiment 1 should not occur 
later in development. By contrast, if  perseveration is a gener-
al phenomenon that can occur whenever strong representations 
are pitted against one another, perseverative biases should oc-
cur in observation-only conditions even at 4 years of  age. Such 
a result would extend the results of  Experiment 1, and would 
call into question the utility of  the two-systems view for ex-
plaining developmental change.
Method
Participants
Sixty 4-year-olds (M = 4 years 3.1 months, SD = 1.8 
months) participated. Data from 4 participants were not ana-
lyzed because either these children did not complete the task 
or there was an experimenter error. Participants were recruited 
and compensated as in Experiment 1, and their parents gave in-
formed consent.
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure were the same as in Experi-
ment 1 except that the child sat on a small chair aligned with 
the center of  the rectangular sandbox, and the parent sat on a 
chair behind and to the left of  the participant. The design was 
the same as in Experiment 1 with one exception: Toys were hid-
den 18 or 24 in. from the left edge of  the sandbox. There were 
14 children in each experimental condition. All sessions were 
scored as in Experiment 1. The mean deviation (absolute value) 
between the two scorers was 0.37 in. (SD = 0.55 in.).
Results and Discussion
Our previous study with 4-year-olds showed that children 
of  this age make robust A-not-B-type errors on the fi rst B trial 
and, further, that such errors weaken on the second and third B 
trials (Schutte et al., 2003). Thus, we focused on performance 
on Trial B1. As can be seen in Figure 3, 4-year-olds’ respons-
es on the fi rst B trial were biased toward A in all conditions. 
Data from each condition were analyzed by comparing respons-
es on the fi rst B trial to zero error. These t tests indicated that 
responses were signifi cantly biased toward A in the observe con-
ditions, t(13) = 2.89, p < .01, when B was at 18 in. and t(13) = 
2.06, p < .05, when B was at 24 in., as well as in the reach con-
ditions, t(13) = 2.97, p < .01, when B was at 18 in. and t(13) = 
4.24, p < .001, when B was at 24 in. In addition, a two-way 
ANOVA with response type and location as between-subjects 
factors revealed no signifi cant effects on Trial B1. Therefore, 
the children made signifi cant A-not-B-type errors regardless of  
whether they reached or observed on the A trials.
It is possible that differences between reach and ob-
serve conditions emerged over B trials. Therefore, we con-
ducted an ANOVA with trial (B1, B2, B3) as a within-sub-
jects factor and response type and location as between-sub-
jects factors. There was a signifi cant main effect of  trial, 
F(2, 104) = 9.32, p < .001, but no other signifi cant effects. As
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expected, the bias toward A was smaller on Trials B2 and B3 
than on Trial B1 (B1: M = 2.34; B2: M = 0.90; B3: M = 0.96). 
Responses on all three B trials, however, were signifi cantly bi-
ased toward A, t(55) = 6.10, p < .001, for Trial B1; t(55) = 2.59, 
p < .01, for Trial B2; and t(55) = 3.09, p < .005, for Trial B3. 
Last, we investigated whether errors on the fi rst B trial dif-
fered signifi cantly from errors on the fi nal A trial in the reach 
condition. Errors on the last A trial were near zero both when B 
was at 18 in. (M =  0.02) and when B was at 24 in. (M =  0.11). 
The t tests comparing errors on this trial and errors on Trial B1 
revealed a signifi cant increase in error toward A on the B trial 
both when B was at 18 in., t(13) = 2.80, p < .025, and when B 
was at 24 in., t(13) = 3.58, p < .005.
In summary, 4-year-olds—like 2-year-olds—showed signifi -
cant biases toward A even when they simply observed hiding 
events on the A trials. Thus, overt responding is not a necessary 
component of  A-not-B-type biases for this age group.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Data from the present study suggest that the two-systems 
account of  A-not-B-type errors does not fully explain the or-
igin of  perseveration in search tasks in early development. In 
particular, the prepotent response account is incomplete. But is 
it also incorrect? For instance, given that A-not-B-type biases 
can arise from a failure to inhibit a prepotent representation, 
is it the case that all A-not-B-type effects arise from this cause 
(for related ideas, see Fox, Kagan, & Weiskopf, 1979; Harris, 
1973; Schacter, Moscovitch, Tulving, McLachlan, & Freedman, 
1986)? We suspect that the answer is no. That is, although the 
A-not-B-type biases observed in some studies might have been 
due to failure to inhibit a prepotent representation, such fail-
ure is not always the cause of  these biases, just as failure to in-
hibit a prepotent response is not always the cause. For instance, 
Smith and her colleagues (1999) have demonstrated convincing-
ly that some perseverative biases are indeed caused by prepo-
tent responses. In particular, infants are less likely to make the 
A-not-B error if  they are in a seated position during the A tri-
als and are moved to a standing position before the fi rst B tri-
al than if  they remain seated throughout the session. Thus, a 
change in body posture that alters the specifi cs of  the reaching 
response can reduce perseveration, even though infants must 
represent the same two hiding locations before and after the 
postural change.
Given that an extreme representational view seems incom-
plete, a second possibility is to retain the two-systems perspec-
tive, but allow for perseverative biases to arise from both sys-
tems. This would require rethinking the meaning of  knowing-
acting dissociations in early development. In particular, re-
searchers would need to chart the developmental trajectory of  
each system, and how the two systems coevolve under different 
task constraints. Such a goal would create a variety of  empiri-
cal challenges. For instance, we went to great effort to develop 
a task that would encourage 2-year-olds to strongly represent 
A even in observation-only conditions. It is not clear how one 
would achieve the same goal with young infants, although do-
ing so seems necessary to track the development of  the repre-
sentational system. 
More generally, we question whether it is possible to com-
pletely isolate and track the development of  representation-
al and response-based systems. Although we used a relative-
ly common methodology to investigate the characteristics 
of  these systems (e.g., Hofstadter & Reznick, 1996; Zelazo 
et al., 1998), recent data reveal that representations and re-
sponses are more intricately connected than was previously 
thought. For instance, humans and nonhuman primates repre-
sent locations in many ways, including relative to the actions 
needed to move to locations (e.g., di Pellegrino & Wise, 1993;
Fig. 3. Four-year-olds’ mean error (in inches) on the fi rst B trial in both the observe and the reach conditions when B was 
located 18 in. from the left edge of  the sandbox and when B was located 24 in. from the left edge. Positive errors indicate 
errors toward A; negative errors indicate errors away from A. Asterisks indicate that responses differed signifi cantly from 
zero error. Error bars show SD/2.
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Georgopoulos, Taira, & Lukashin, 1993; Smyrnis, Taira, Ashe, 
& Georgopoulos, 1992). Thus, it is diffi cult to distinguish be-
haviorally between representational and response-based pro-
cesses because one can generate representations of  responses. 
Moreover, it is diffi cult to separate representations and respons-
es in time because they are continuously coupled and interde-
pendent. Studies with adults have demonstrated that even af-
ter a reaching movement has started, there is continuous updat-
ing of  the represented target location (van Sonderen, Gielen, & 
Denier van der Gon, 1989). Furthermore, at any point during 
movement, actions can be continuously updated on the basis 
of  newly represented information (Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002; 
Ghez et al., 1997). Thus, it is not the case that response-based 
processes start and representational processes stop the moment 
an overt response begins. Finally, data suggest that representa-
tions—far from being isolated from perceptual-motor process-
es—are largely contained within perceptual-motor cortical ar-
eas (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Damasio & Damasio, 1994).
In light of  these data, we conclude by raising a third pos-
sible interpretation of  our results that moves beyond the modi-
fi ed two-systems view. Specifi cally, we propose that persevera-
tive biases refl ect the operation of  a single system. For instance, 
recent connectionist and dynamic systems models show that 
knowing-acting dissociations can arise from a single, dynamic, 
integrated system that acts differently in different situations 
(e.g., Spencer & Schöner, 2003; Thelen et al., 2001). We contend 
that this view raises exciting new questions for future study, 
questions that are empirically tractable. From this perspective, 
the challenge is not to try to further isolate representations and 
responses, but rather to understand how infants and children 
encode locations, maintain location-related information dur-
ing delays in the context of  ongoing movements and changes 
in the environment, and use represented information—includ-
ing representations of  actions—to generate a response (for re-
lated ideas, see Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 2000). And, most 
relevant to this study, it will be necessary to understand how 
children’s trial-to-trial experience is integrated with and affects 
these processes. Thus, a more complete understanding of  perse-
verative biases might lie beyond dichotomous thinking in a sin-
gle-system perspective that embraces the complexity of  ‘‘sim-
ple’’ behaviors like reaching to a remembered location. 
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